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1 Introduction
Concentration in the beef packing industry has been rising for the past 25
years. This has generated both concern among policymakers and interest
from academiceconomistsabout theability of packing plants to exploit their
market position by in‡uencing theconditionsunderwhich they purchaselive
cattle. Several studiesofoligopsony power inbeefpacking haveled to mixed
results (see Azzam (1998) for an overview of this literature). Some studies
…nd a small but signi…cant degree of market power, while others …nd no
evidence that packers are able to exploit their position in the purchase of
fed cattle.
¤Authors are Assistant Professor, Graduate Research Assistant and Professor in the
Department of Economics at Utah State University. This research has been supported by
cooperative agreement 99-ESS-01 with the USDA Grain Inspection, Packers and Stock-
yard Administration. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and
not necessarily those of the USDA or of the Gran Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Ad-
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The usual caveat applies.
1In most studies, exercise of market power is de…ned as the ability of
packing …rms to reduce the price they pay for their inputs below a compet-
itive level. Unfortunately, without further assumptions, one cannot know
what priceswould be iftheindustry were“competitive.” Most studiessolve
thisproblem by noting that packer costs determine what a competitive level
of prices would be. They then use an estimate of costs based on input
prices paid, processing costs, and marginal value product. However, as is
well known, costs and marginal value product are quite di¢cult to measure
accurately, let alone obtain from packing …rms. In this paper, we avoid
the problem of knowing what competitive prices would be by developing an
indirect measure of packer behavior that is related to the exerciseofmarket
power but does not need cost and marginal value product data. Instead,
our statisticis based on the proportion of its salesa particular feedlot makes
to a given packer. This is easy to quantify ifappropriate data are available.
Ourstatisticallows us to classify feedlots as being in theprimary market
area (PMA) of one or more packing plants. This gives an indirect measure
of packer exercise of market power, since a packing plant presumably has
more control over a feedlot when it is that feedlot’s major customer. Our
hypothesis is that one way for packers to exercise power over their cattle
suppliers is to divide feedlots among themselves and each visit only their
own feedlots. In e¤ect, the feedlots are “captive” to the packer that visits.
In a competitive market, packing plants would have limited control over
feedlot sales, and we would expect to see feedlots selling to all packers,
2with switches occurring as a di¤erent packer o¤ers a higher price. Thus,
in a competitive market observed over several months, feedlots should sell
approximately equal numbers to all packing plants in theregion, and should
regularly switch between customers.
The idea of feedlot capture is related to notions of captive supplies.
One theory of the relationship between packing …rms and their suppliers
suggests packers capture needed supplies through contractual arrangements
with feedlots (Schroeder, Mintert and Barkley (1993), Hayenga and O’Brien
(1992), Ward, Koontz, Dowty, Trapp and Peel (1999), Ward, Koontz and
Schroeder(1998), Ward, Schroeder, Barkley andKoontz(1996)). Ourstatis-
tic goesfurther, and looks at the possibility that packers capture a majority
ofthecattlesold by thefeedlot, instead of just a portion ofthefeedlot’s out-
put. Finding an exclusive relationship between feedlots and packers would
lend support to our theory of capture.
Notice that every packer may purchase cattle from a given county, so
that market areas may overlap. Thus, our …ndings may contradict the
theory of spatial market power which suggests that linear transportation
costs may create exclusive areas for each plant. Since we are not using this
statistic to test the e¤ects of distance on feedlot sales, overlapping market
areas do not a¤ect conclusions regarding the relationship between a feedlot
and its primary customer(s). Even if all packing plants purchase cattlefrom
a given county, as long as individual feedlots within the county are visited
by one or few packers, we de…ne those feedlots as “captured”.
3While the statistic we develop may show that a feedlot sells a large
amount to a given packer, this may simply be because the packer generally
o¤ersthehighest net price. However, it isunlikely that a particularpacking
plant will o¤er the highest net price in every single period. If the market is
competitive, then, we would expect to see feedlot sales regularly switching
between plants over the course of a year, depending on which plant o¤ers
the highest price. Our paper’s second section considers how to measure
the switching behavior of plants. The more feedlots are able to switch
between packing plants, the more likely it is that the market is competitive,
even when the statistic from the paper’s …rst section describes feedlots as
captured by a particular packer.
There are many reasons why feedlots would be visited by only one pack-
ing plant, most ofwhich do not involvepackercontrol oftheprices they pay.
It may be that packers are minimizing their transactions costs by visiting
only those feedlots known to the packer. In this way, the packer ensures a
particular quality or size of cattle coming through the plant. The packer
also minimizes the cost of negotiating to purchase a lot if it deals only with
feedlots it knows. It may also be that the feedlot is so much closer to the
packer that it doesn’t make sense for the feedlot to sell to any otherpacking
plant. In the paper’s third section, we develop an empirical model to con-
trol for these explanations of the relationship between feedlots and packing
…rms.
42 Geography and the relationship between pack-
ers and feedlots
Our…rst task isto examinetherelationship between feedlots and thepackers
they sell to. Our statisticis based on one developed by Brorsen, Bailey and
Thomsen (1997), who look at the likelihood that a particular lot of cattle
will be shipped from a particular county to a particular marketing center.1
They use county-level data to examine the division of cattle feeding regions
among majormarketing areasandthedegreeofoverlapbetween eachtrading
center’s primary market area (PMA). A county is de…ned as being in a
trading center’s primary market area if a larger percentage than expected
of the lots sold from the county are shipped to the trading center. The
statistic they develop is used to determine whether geographic markets are
segmentedornot. Their research suggests that it isnot appropriateto treat
the Oklahoma City feeder cattlemarket separately from theOmaha market.
In fact, Brorsen et al. (1997) …nd that primary market areas for the major
trading centers overlap to such an extent that the market for feeder cattle
must really be treated as a national market, rather than a set of regional
markets.
We modify this statistic to examine the likelihood that a given pen of
cattle are sold from a particular feedlot to a particular packer. Suppose a
1There is an extensive literature on the e¤ects of competition in spatial markets on
prices that …rms charge for outputs (or pay for inputs). See Zhang and Sexton (2000) for
an application of this literature to beef packing. Our work does not directly consider what
is known as spatial price discrimination. Instead, we study the possibility of geographic
division of feedlots among packers and the e¤ects of this division on input prices.
5region has K packing plants. If packers within the region are relatively
close together, and assuming minimal price di¤erentials, we would expect
feedlots to sell an equal number of their lots to each packer. Feedlots which
sell more than 1=Kth of their total lots to one packer are said to be in that
packer’s PMA. Notice that a feedlot may be in up to K¡1 PMAs, so that
thisstatistic allowsusto characterizethe degreeofoverlap between packing
plants. Presumably, the more PMAs a given feedlot is in, the less control
any one of its customers has over its sales. Also, the larger the number of
feedlots in more than one PMA, the more competitive the market is likely
to be.
Problems arise when examining small feedlots, as they are morelikely to
beput in aPMA even when they sell thesamenumberoflotsto each packer.
For example, a feedlot that sold three lotstothreedi¤erent packers would be
put into three PMAs even though its sales were evenly divided. To obtain
any information of use from these smaller feedlots, we used a smoothing
technique developed by Brorsen et al. (1997) to infer how a smaller feedlot
would behave were it to be an average feedlot.
In all of these formulas, p is the probability that a given lot is sold from






As the probability that lot n is sold from feedlot i to packer k. Ni is the
total number of transactions feedlot i is involved in, and yikn is set to one
6if lot n was sold from feedlot i to packer k. To account for problems with
smallerfeedlots, weincludetransactionsfrom“nearby” feedlotsindescribing
how smaller than average feedlots behaved. Thus, our smoothed estimate











> > > > <
> > > > :
1 if j = i





> > > > <






if Ni < M and Ni +N¤
i >M
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N¤
i is the total number of transactions the feedlots adjacent to i are
involved in, and M is the number beyond which no smoothing is needed.
Generally speaking, M may be taken astheaveragenumberofsalesmadeby
feedlots in the data set. That way, smaller-than-average feedlots have their
sales weighted by the sales ofneighboring feedlots, whilelarger-than-average
feedlots do not.
An important step necessary for carrying out the above calculations is
determining which feedlots to include in the smoothing statistic. In the
work done by Brorsen et al. (1997), any county sharing a border with the
7speci…c county i was de…ned as adjacent and included when smoothing was
required. Sincewe reinterpret this statisticto look at individual feedlots, we
need some measure of the distance between feedlots.2 Let ¹ d be the average
distance between feedlots, and ¾2
d be the variance of these distances. We
de…ne feedlots which are closerthan one standard deviation below the mean
as adjacent, since there is only a 16% chance that feedlots will be less than
this distance apart. We argue that transportation costs are relatively minor
and do not a¤ect the probability of selling to a given packer for feedlots
within ¹ d¡¾d miles of each other.
Thus, our smoothed statistic is essentially a weighted average between
^ p0
ik and ^ p¤
ik, where ^ p¤
ik represents the(possibly smoothed) probability of sales








When pik is de…ned as thetrueprobability of transactions between feed-









According to this formula, there is no bias when feedlot i and the adja-
cent feedlots have the same transaction probabilities (µ = 1) or when there
is no smoothing (°i =0).
2Notice that it is the distance between feedlots that is used, not the distance from the
feedlots to packing plants in the area.




binomial distribution. Assuming that µ = 1 (that is, the underlying prob-
ability that feedlot i ships to a given packer is the same as the probability
that i’s neighbors ship to the same packer) the numerator of ^ pik also has
a binomial distribution. Steel and Torrie (1960) show that the number of
observations required to invoke the central limit theorem depends on 1=K.
For example, if 1=K = 0:25, then 140 observations are required to invoke
the central limit theorem and use a normal distribution to approximate the
binomial distribution. If 1=K = 0:125, then 500 observations are required
to invokethe central limit theorem, and if1=K = 0:5, then only 30 observa-
tionsare needed beforethecentral limit theorem can be invoked. Assuming
that thenumberofsalesis largeenough, wecan createthefollowing statistic




where p0 =pik, ¾2
^ pik =pik(1¡pik)=c, and c = Ni+°iN¤
i : When the number
of sales is not large enough to invoke the central limit theorem, we are
required to assume that µ = 1 (i.e. that feedlot i and its neighbors are
equally likely to ship to a given packer), and use the binomial distribution
to determine the likelihood that ^ pik is signi…cantly di¤erent from 1=K.
Thus far, we have de…ned a feedlot as in a packer’s PMA area if ^ pik >
1=K. Notice, however, that this test statistic allows one to use various
values for pik in classifying feedlots as in a packer’s primary market area.
9For example, the researcher might wish to classify a feedlot in a packing
plant’s primary market area only if it ships over three-quarters ofits output
to that plant. Inthis case, pik =0:75 would be used, and only thosefeedlots
with ^ pik >0:75 would be classi…ed as in a PMA.
3 “Captive” feedlots and switching behavior
While a feedlot may be in a packer’s primary market area, this masks much
potential instability in the relationship between the feedlot and the packer.
As noted by Gort (1963), a given industry may be quite concentrated but
still competitive, if the stability of relationships within the industry is low.
For example, the feedlot may regularly sell a small portion of its output to
other packers, or it may sell to whichever packing plant visits …rst. Also,
the feedlot have switched between primary customers at some point during
the period under observation.
According to Gort (1963), when stability in relationships is low, large
…rms are engaged in competition for market share so that even though con-
centration ishigh, instability in market shares ensures competitivebehavior.
This idea was expanded upon by Davies and Geroski (1997), and Baldwin
and Gorecki (1994), who performed cross-sectional regression analysis on
manufacturing industries in the U.K. and Canada respectively, and …nd
that concentration and stability are not always positively correlated. That
is, an industry may be quite concentrated, but relationships between buy-
ers and sellers so unstable that prices remain competitive. Our statistic
10developed above gives a measure of spatial market power, but it may mask
a large degree of instability which limits packers’ ability to exercise market
power.
One way to bring out this potential instability would be to divide the
sample into shorter time periods (one week or one month for example), and
perform our PMA calculations for each period. We then have a new set of
data, Zikt wheret indexesperiod. Thelargerthenumberofperiodsa feedlot
is in a given packer’s PMA, the higherthe stability in therelationship. The
more feedlots with stable relationships with one or a few packers, the less
likely is the market to be competitive. Thus, sorting feedlots into groups
based on the percentage of one-week periods in which they were classi…ed
into their primary customer’s (as given by Zik for the entire data set) PMA
might indicate the stability of relationships in the market. Alternatively,
one could …nd the average and standard deviation among feedlots for the
number of periods in which both Zikt and Zik put feedlot i into packer k’s











1 if Zikt and Zik are both signi…cantly positive
0 otherwise
A larger average suggests more stable relationships, as does a smaller stan-
dard deviation.
Alternatively, it might be possible to determine the number of shorter
11(one-week) periods during which the feedlot sells only to its primary cus-
tomer. The larger this number, the more stable is the relationship between
the packer and its primary customer, and the higher the likelihood that the
feedlot is indeed “captured” by its primary customer. Once again, one can
group feedlots based on thenumberofperiodssold to primary customers. If
a large number of feedlots usually sell exclusively to their primary customer
then relationshipsin thismarket are fairly stable. Also as before, one could
calculate the average and standard deviation for the number of periods that
feedlots sell to their primary customer. In this case, the variable of interest




teikt)=I, where eikt = 1 if feedlot i sells exclusively
to packer k (its primary customer) in period t. As before, larger averages
with smaller standard deviations suggest a higher degree of stability in the
market.
4 Explaining the division of feedlots
So far, we have suggested two indirect measures of the competitiveness of
a market. We have also tried to draw inferences regarding the exercise of
market power based on these indirect measures. Once again, we run up
against the problem that many factors can explain the stability of packer-
feedlot relationships, most of which are not related to theexercise of packer
market power. In this section, we suggest a regression equation to control
for alternative explanations of stability in the packer-feedlot relationship.
The coe¢cients on the regressors will give some idea of the importance of
12each factor to the stability of the packer-feedlot relationship. In addition,
the regression residuals can be analyzed to see if they have any sort of
underlying relationship. Such a relationship, if found, might be indicative
of the exercise of market power.
As noted, stability in the relationship between feedlots and packers can
be explained by many things. For example, it might be that the feedlot is
located right next door to the packing plant, so that the cost to transport a
pen from seller to buyer is near zero. Perhaps thepacker consistently o¤ers
the feedlot a higher price net of transportation costs than its competitors.
The feedlot may have a contract with the packer which accounts for a large
part of its sales. Relationships are costly to establish, and buyers may not
think it worth their while to visit smallerfeedlots known to sell themajority
of their output to another packer.
To distinguish each of these causes, the following empirical model could
be used.
PROPijt = f(PROPijt¡1; PDIFt; PCTCONTR;FLSIZEit; PERSISTit)
and
PDIFt =Pijt ¡Pikt =g(DIST; COMPDIST;QUALITY;CAP)
Where PROPijt gives the percentage of spot market transactions between
feedlot i and its primary customer j in period t; PDIFt gives the …tted
13di¤erence in price o¤ered by the prmary customer and all other packers,
PCTCONTR gives the percentage of its output that the feedlot sells to
its primary customer on contract, and FLSIZEit is the number of lots
sold by the ith feedlot during each period and acts as a proxy for feedlot
size. Economiesofsizein developing andmaintaining relationships between
feedlots and packers may reduce transaction costs between a large feedlot
and a packer compared to smaller feedlots. If this is true then FLSIZE
will have a positive, signi…cant coe¢cient. PERSIST is a dummy variable
set to oneif the di¤erencein prices o¤ered by packers is large and lastsmore
than one period. We include the variable PERSIST to test the possibility
that while current period price di¤erences may not have a large e¤ect on
feedlot sales to a given packer, a persistent price di¤erence will eventually
cause a larger shift in sales.
The di¤erence in price o¤ered by the primary customer and all other
packers k is presumed to depend on DIST, the distance from the feedlot to
packerj, COMPDIST, thedistancefrom feedlot i to packerk, QUALITY ,
the quality of the lot being sold, and CAP, the capacity utilization of the
purchasing packing plant and its nearby competitors.
This speci…cation leads to two tests of market power. First, if the
market is competitive, feedlots should sell to the packer o¤ering the highest
price net oftransportation costs. Thus, we expect the coe¢cient on PDIF
to be positive and signi…cant. If it is negative or not signi…cant, then
feedlotsdo not necessarily sell to thepackero¤ering thehighest price. Given
14that we have controlled for other explanations of the stability of feedlot-
packer relationships, this gives evidence that packers have some degree of
control over feedlots. Second, each of these variables is included to control
for alternative explanations of the stability of feedlot-packer relationships.
Any unexplained variation in the dependent variable may tentatively be
attributed to packer control over feedlots.
Our speci…cation also allows us to examine the possibility that the spot
and contract markets are related. By including PCTCONTR in our main
regression, we are able to test the hypothesis that the more a feedlot sells
to a packer in the contract market, the more it will sell to that same packer
in the spot market. This hypothesis is supported if the coe¢cient on
PCTCONTR is positive and signi…cant. If contracts are made to avoid
transaction costs, then a relationship between the contract and spot market
suggests that transaction costs may explain some of the stability in spot
market sales found above.
5 Conclusion
Consolidations in the beef packing industry have led to many attempts to
determine the degreeto which packersare ableto control their environment.
Several studies have de…ned environmental control as the ability of packers
to reduce the prices they pay for fed beef. Unfortunately, this de…nition
depends crucially on the ability to determine what input prices would have
been in a competitive market. Generally speaking, studies use estimates of
15packer costs to make inferences about what competitive prices would have
been. While this is theoretically satisfying, estimating packer costs is a
di¢cult exercise, and conclusions regarding market power depend critically
on accurate estimates.
We propose an alternative view of market power. If packers exer-
cise what we call spatial market power, then they are able to behave as
monopsonists toward their “captive” input suppliers. Thus, examining the
strength of the relationship between packing …rms and feedlots should give
an indication of whether packers are ableto in‡uencetheterms underwhich
they purchse fed cattle. Our indicators have the advantage of depending
on easily observed and measured variables.
Ofcoursepackersmay haveexclusiverelationshipswithfeedlotsformany
reasons not related to the exercise of market power. In the paper’s third
section, we discuss some of these reasons, and suggest a regression model
designed to control for many of them. Taken together, our indicators and
regression results may give indirect evidence of packer behavior. Inasmuch
as our evidence does not rely on hard-to-measure variables, it may allow
for morede…nitive conclusions regarding whether concern about themarket
structure beef packing is justi…ed.
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